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THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF AN AVIATOR AS
CARRIER OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS
ROWAN A.

GREER*

I.
It is axiomatic to say that law is not an exact science. This
is most forcibly illustrated by the fact that there is no unanimity of
opinion, even among lawyers, as to the definition of law itself. For
many years Blackstone's Commentaries was the fundamental basis
upon which any study of law, particularly in this country, was built.
No man was considered competent to engage in the practice of law
without some knowledge of these lectures. Today, in most of the
high ranking legal educational institutions, there are few, if any,
lectures on Blackstone. His work is no longer used as a text book
and, indeed, even rarely referred to. He lived and worked in the
Eighteenth Century when both secular and ecclesiastical authority
recognized the so-called divine rights of the sovereign. Therefore,
in giving his definition of law, Sir William Blackstone said it was:
"A rule of civil conduct pr~cribed by the supreme power in a
state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong."

We are not told where we are to find the right or the wrong of
any situation except in the mandate or the prohibition contained in
the rule itself. However, the king-the supreme power in the state
-being divine, or executing his powers through divine inspiration,
could do no wrong and hence for the philosophy of Blackstone's
age and time, this definition was quite satisfactory and sound
enough.
Without inviting argument over the merits of the question, we
will venture the bold assertion that there has been an advance in
*Captain, J. A. G. D., United States Army. Chief, Legal Branch, and
member Advisory Board of the Am LAw INsTi.TuT.
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knowledge, culture and civilization since the age of Blackstone.
No one will now so much as' do reverence to the doctrine of divine
rights or support any action of a sovereign power upon the theory
that the king can do no wrong. As a consequence, we cannot in
this day and time say that the mere pronouncement of the supreme
power in a state, by either mandate or prohibition, can make any
action right or wrong from an ethical consideration. Even our
great Declarhtion of Independence after setting forth the inalienable
rights with which all men are endowed says:
"That, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to
institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and
organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely
to effect their safety and happiness."
From this, the writer personally prefers the definition of law
given by Professor Holland in his work on "The Elements of
Jurisprudence," where he says:
"A law, in the proper sense of the term, is a general rule of human
action taking cognizance only of external acts, enforced by a determinate authority, which authority is human, and, among human authorities,
is that which is paramount in a political society."
When the true origin and function oflaw is borne in mind,
then, it is nothing more nor less than a rule of conduct settled by
universal, or more accurately speaking dominant custom, by virtue
of the acceptance and adoption of the same by the element in the
particular society concerned that is paramount. In a pure, or a
representative democracy, such as ours, that paramount element is
not the courts nor yet the legislatures or congress, but the majority
of the people themselves. From a theoretical point of view, an
Act of Congress or the decision of a judge does not become a law
merely by virtue of its passage or pronouncement. An act of a
legislative body or an opinion of a judge becomes law in its true
sense and gains its weight or authority only so far as it reflects what
the public opinion, of, th society by its acts and customs have
established as the most generally accepted rule. The act or the
decision is not law ipso facto, but becomes so in its true sense only
so far as it reflects what the public opinion of the society it affects
has established as the rule most generally accepted. The act or
decision is only the concrete evidence of what that law is or should
be. This being true, municipal law, if its proper function be taken
into consideration, can never lead but must always follow public
opinion or custom.
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II.
In the field of aerodynamics, the practicability of sustained
flight by man was demonstrated by the Wright Brothers a little
over twenty-five years ago at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. Many
of us can remember that first flight on December 17, 1903, and can
likewise recall the skepticism with which the news was received.
Though forced to admit the reality of this first flight, there were
few who believed that the airplane would ever be taken seriously as
a means of transportation or become a factor in the commercial
life of the country. That aviation is here today was most forcibly
illustrated in an interview at the beginning of the year 1930, by
Mr. Kent Cooper, the General Manager of the Associated Press,
where, in pointing out ten of the most conspicuous news items of
the year 1929, he mentioned three out of. the ten that concerned
aviation; the first being the globe encircling, flight of the Graf
Zeppelin in April; the second, the disaster of the T.A.T. passenger
carrying ship in September when seven people were killed and
the third, the flight of Commander, now Admiral Byrd in November over the South Pole. When any one phase of activity can
attract such prominent attention in the current events of the world,
surely the subject is worthy of note by all who are concerned with
what is taking place around them.
The regular scheduled air transport planes in the United States
are now flying approximately ninety thousand miles per day and
this represents only about fifteen per cent of the flying for hire that
is done in commercial aeronautics. According to statistics that
are available, during the past year sixteen million miles were flown
on scheduled operations in the U nited States, eighty-five thousand
passengers were carried and over eight million pounds of mail
transported. 1930 bids fair to greatly increase these figures. Under this state of facts and with this volume of business carried on,
one can scarcely deny the proposition that custom has had some
opportunity of determining a rule of conduct fixing the liability
and defining the responsibility of the aircraft operator.
The legal profession should be the first to sense what time and
custom establishes as that rule of conduct or law and to see that
it is based upon principles of justice and right and that in the
court decisions and legislative enactments a true and correct expression of that rule is given.
Our law of damages under which compensation is awarded to
an injured party is uniformly based upon either a tortious breach
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of some contractual obligation or some act of negligence where therights of another are invaded through either the doing of something that an ordinarily careful and prudent person, under similar
circumstances, would not have done, or stated negatively, the failing to do what an ordinarily careful and prudent person under
similar circumstances would have done.

III.
In the matter of transportation of goods and persons through
other agencies than the air, the-e are two distinct rules of conduct
fixing the responsibility and liability of, the carrier. If the carrier
is a special or private carrier, the standard or guide to go by in
fixing his liability is that of ordinary negligence, whether it be
persons or goods that are transported. In other words, a carrier,
other than a common carrier, is merely a bailee for hire for the
mutual benefit of both parties and his liability rests upon the showing of ordinary negligence in carrying out the contract of transportation. On the other hand, if the carrier is what the law designates
as a common carrier, a different rule exists as to the responsibility
and duty under which the carrier operates. If the contract is for
the transportation of goods, as stated in 4 R.C.L., Paragraph 175:
"At common law, it has been long settled that a common carrier
is responsible for the safe transportation and delivery of goods received
by him for carriage, and can justify or excuse a default only when
occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy. Hence, while a
contract for the carriage of goods is of course a form of bailment so
that a common carrier is liable, as .an ordinary bailee, for negligence,
his liability is not confined merely to such losses as are the consequences of his own negligence or want of skill, but he is also held
responsible for all losses or damage which may happen to goods while
in his charge for the purposes of his employment, though occasioned
by unavoidable accident or by any casualty whatever, except only as
above mentioned. Thus, within the purview of his common law contract
of carriage is embraced protection against all losses due to 'accident,
mistake, and numerous unavoidable occurrences not falling under the
head of acts of God or the public enemy, and against which it is not
within the reach of human vigilance or foresight to provide, as, for
instance, the wrongful acts of third persons, accidental fires, robbery,
or the violence of mobs. From this severe responsibility to which by
the common law he is subjected, he cannot relieve himself by proof
of the highest possible care on his part, nor will his entire faultlessness
excuse him, but, whenever a loss occurs from any cause other than
the act of God or the public enemy, the law may be said to raise against
the carrier an absolute and conclusive presumption of negligence. So
it may be stated that the liabilities of a common carrier are distinguish-
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able into two classes: the one, a liability for losses by neglect, which is
the liability of a bailee; the other, a liability for losses by accident,
or other unavoidable occurrence, which is the liability of an insurer."

In many states the exceptions allowed by the common law
rule, as above stated, have been broadened to include such things
as where the goods were lost by their own decay, from an inherent
infirmity, or by some act or default of the owner or shipper himself but at the same time it is safe to say that the general doctrine
practically accepted in all states is that as to transportation of goods,
the duty and liability of a common carrier under American jurisprudence is that of an insurer.

As to the carriage of passengers, again we find in 4 R.C.L.,
Paragraphs 582 to 586 a very full and fair statement of the rule
of liability applicable to common carriers as follows:
"While carriers of goods are practically insurers of the property
entrusted to them, yet in the carriage of passengers the same principles
of law are not applied, for the obvious reason that a great distinction
exists between persons and goods, passengers being capable of taking
care of themselves, and of exercising that vigilance and foresight in
the maintenance of their rights which the owners of goods who have
entrusted them to others cannot do. Although a few early English
cases apparently countenanced the doctrine that common carriers of
passengers are liable as insurers of the safety of the passengers whom
they undertake to carry, it is now well established, both in England
and in the United States, that carriers of passengers are not insurers
against accident, but are answerable for any injury to a passenger only
when there has been a want of proper care, diligence or skill on the
part of the carrier or his servants, unless such injury be wilfully inflicted. It will thus be seen that the liability of the carrier of passengers
differs materially from that of a carrier of goods. The latter is held to
be an insurer against all injuries except such as are caused by the act
of God, the public enemy, or the owner, while a carrier of passengers
is not responsible for an injury caused by an unforeseen accident against
which human care and foresight could not guard, and not in any degree
caused by negligence, nor for such perils as occur wholly without their
agency, unless there is some want of care in escaping from the consequences of such perils. Thus, for instance, a carrier of passengers is
not liable for injuries to passengers through accidents arising from an
extraordinary storm, flood, or other unavoidable casualty caused by
the hidden forces of nature, unknown to common experience, and which
could not have been reasonably anticipated, nor for injuries arising
from acts of strangers or fellow passengers over whom the carrier
has no control, and whose action is not reasonably to be expected.
* * * What degree of care a carrier must observe for the safety of
a passenger, to exonerate it from liability for injury, is a question of
law, and the generally accepted rule on this point is to the effect that
carriers of passengers are bound to exercise the highest degree of care,
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vigilance and precaution. Attempts have been made, with varying
success, to point out the distinction between gross, ordinary and slight
negligence and if there is any real distinction it is clear that the law
imposes on a carrier a liability to a passenger for slight negligence,
requiring of it the exercise of the highest possible degree of care.
The rule as to the degree of care required of carriers of passengers
has been variously stated, some courts employing the word 'utmost,'
others 'greatest' and still others 'extraordinary.' The difference in +he
statements, however, is merely a choice of words, and does not denote
conflicting views. The reason for imposing such a high degree of
care on carriers of passengers is that the safety and lives of their
passengers rests entirely in their hands, the passengers having no
control whatever over the dangerous instrumentalities employed in their
transportation, and public policy requires that a high degree of care
be exacted."
From this it appears that -before the airplane was used as a
means of transportation, the rule of law as to other modes of carriage was comparatively clear. If the carrier is a private or special
carrier, liability as to both goods and persons only attached upon a
showing of ordinary negligence on the part of the carrier. In other
words, the same conditions of liability exist as prevail in any mutual
benefit bailment contract. If the carrier is a so-called common
carrier, then as to the transportation of goods he stands generally
speaking as an insurer and as to persons he is bound to exercise the
highest degree of care known to mankind in that particular line of
business as a practical means of securing safe passage.
IV.
There .is no fixed or uniform rule at present as to the aviator.
Shall he be held as an ordinary bailee, an insurer, be bound to the
exercise of the highest degree of care, or should an entirely different
rule of law be applied to this mode of transportation from that
applicable to other agencies performing the same service? To intelligently answer this question, it seems there must first be a determination of the point as to whether one conducting a business
of transportation of goods and passengers, similarly to other concerns but using the airplane as a method or means of carriage,
should be regarded as a common carrier or merely a special or
private carrier. What then constitutes being a common carrien?
The definition of. a common carrier usually adopted in this country
is that of C. J. Parker in Dwight v. Brewster,' where he says:
1.. 1 Pick. 50.
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"A common carrier is one who undertakes for hire to transport the
goods of such as choose to employ him from place to place."
Chancellor Kent has said that common carriers are those who:
"Undertake generally and not as a casual occupation and for all
people indefinitely to convey goods and deliver them at a place appointed, for hire, as a business and with or without a special agreement
as to price."2
In the case of North American Accident Insurance Company v.
Pitts,' the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama in deciding
whether the death from an airplane accident entitled the plaintiff
to thei double indemnity provided in an insurance policy that contained a provision of double compensation in the event of death
while traveling as a passenger on a common carrier, adopted the
definition of a common carrier as previously announced by the same
court in Georgia Life Insurance Company v. Easter,' where the
definition pertained to travel by land or water, the court saying
the words "or air" might be added after the word "water" with
propriety announced:
"The real test whether a man is a common carrier, either by land
or water (or air), therefore, really is whether it is held that he will, so
long as he has room, carry for hire the goods of every person who will
bring goods to him to be carried. The test is not whether he is carrying as a public employment or whether he carries to a fixed place, but
whether he holds out, either expressly or by a course of conduct, that
he will carry for hire so long as he has room the goods of all persons
individually who send him goods to be carried."
In the particular case last referred to, under the facts presented, the court held thaf the aviator was not a common carrier.
Another suit involving the same state of fact was disposed of in
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In reaching
the same conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court of Alabama,
the Circuit Court of Appeals recited the facts of the case as follows :5
"The following facts are not disputed:
'Lieutenant Whitted, formerly in the Naval Aviation Service,
owned a hydroaeroplane and operated it himself at Camp Walton, Fla., a
summer resort, where he took passengers upon pleasure trips in the
air to let them enjoy the doubtful pleasures of flying. The plane held
six persons, including the pilot. The trips lasted about ten minutes
in the air and the plane returned to the point from which it started
2.
3.
4.
5.

2 Kent Com. 598.
213 Ala. 103 (1925).
189 Ala. 478.
8 F. (2d) 996.

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
for which he charged the passengers $5.00 each. He would not go up
with less than three passengers and carried only white people. He
operated on such days and such hours and under such conditions as
pleased him and did not pretend to maintain regular schedules. He
did not advertise his business unless keeping his plane anchored at
the resort and having his helper in the vicinity of the usual landing
place to give information would be so called. On August 19, 1923,
Hugh D. Brown, the insured, who was visiting Camp Walton with his
wife, went up with Whitted and three others. When up in the air
something went wrong with the machine; it fell and all were killed.
From the above-quoted facts, it is clear that Whitted was not a common
carrier. He assumed no duty to the public to.carry them and if he
refused to do so, without any reason at all, no action would lie against
him., See Hutchinson on Carriers (3d Ed. Secs. 47, 48)'."
I do not think anyone would seri6usly contend that there is any
error in the conclusion reached by the court in this case but, at the
same time, reasoning conversely from the facts cited therein, one is
equally forced to the conclusion that had Lieutenant Whitted been
engaged in carrying passengers from one point to another, making
regular scheduled flights that were advertised publicly for certain
days or at certain hours, and that this was his regular business and
he offered inducements and sought to have the public generally
patronize his ship in going from place to place and maintained
regular waiting rooms, terminal facilities and sold regular printed
tickets to all who offered themselves as passengers, one cannot
doubt, but that under such circumstances, he would have been regarded as a common carrier of pasengers.
According to the Air Commerce Bulletin of the United States
Department of Commerce of January 15, 1930, there were altogether in this country as of that date seventy-six air transport
routes, regularly maintained with scheduled flights over these various routes, by airplane transportation companies. Of these seventysix routes, twenty-six were maintained for passenger-carrying purposes alone and covered distances generally, fromj fifteen miles
between Seattle and Bremmerton with eleven flights per day to
1,439 miles between Los Angeles and Kansas City with one plane
a day each day of the year. Twelve of these routes carried mail
alone. Six of them carried mail and express. Ten carried passengers and express and thirteen of them carried mail, passengers
and express combined. Except for the ones carrying mail alone,
it is confidently believed that the operators of all these lines, if the
question be brought before a court, would be regarded as common
carriers. They all maintain regular terminal facilities of one way
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or another, have standard fares, regular trips and advertise their
willingness to transport passengers and express and seek the
patronage of the public in quite an energetic way. More than
one company advertises generally a regular transport service of a
transcontinental character in conjunction with a railroad, over a
joint air-rail route, where the travel by day is on the air line, and
the travel by night over a connecting railway. In all the advertisements of one of these companies, printed rather inconspicuously, is
the statement "A Private Carrier." The ticket that is sold by this
company has a number of conditions printed thereon headed by
the statement:
"Not a Common Carrier. This company is not a common carrier
for hire and does not hold out itself to the public as a common carrier
and reserves the right to reject any and/or all applicants for transportation; and to accept applicants for transportation upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem fit, irrespective of the terms and conditions
accorded others who may be accepted for transportation."
Mr. E. A. Harriman of the Washington, D. C. Bar, in an
article appearing in the Journal of Air Law,6 commenting upon
such a condition on a contract of carriage, said:
"Stranger things have happened than the adjustment by the courts
of old definitions to.new facts and it will require not one decision but
a series of decisions to insure the success of the air carrier in its
attempt to form part of a transcontinental route in this manner and
at the same time to escape by contract any liability as a common carrier."
The business organization of this company is identical with
that of the associated railroad company and its purpose is identically
the same, to-wit, the transportation of passengers and goods from
place to place in, a regular way for a certain fixed compensation or
price. In other words, it has every ear mark and characteristic of
a common carrier, similar to its associated railroad company, with
the exception that it seeks to say that, although it does the same
thing the railroad company does, it is not a common carrier.
Mr. Hutchinson in his work on Common Carriers, 3rd Edition,
Sec. 44, says:
"It is, however, by no means to be understood that the common
carrier can by his contract or in any other mode become as to the
carriage of particular goods merely a private carrier for hire, whilst
he is, in fact, a, common carrier of such goods generally. If he could
do this, he could, of course, provide by contract against liability for
6. Volume 1, No. 1, Pages 33, 36.
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losses occurring from the negligence of himself or his servants which,
as we have seen, it is competent for the private carrier to do. But
according to the weight of authority, at least in this country, as we
shall hereafter see, common carriers will not be permitted under any
circumstances or in any manner to protect themselves against the consequence of their own negligence in the carriage of either goods or
passengers."
The same authority later on, speaking of railroad companies,
said:
"Railroad companies are by their very nature and organic character common carriers, whether made so by the general statute or by
their charters or not; and whenever they are made so by the express
provisions of a law, such provisions will be considered as merely declaratory of the law as it already existed and will neither increase their
duties and obligations nor in any respect qualify their liability. They
have sometimes attempted to defend themselves from liability by disputing the proposition that they were common carriers, but the contention has received no countenance from the courts and it has been
held in many cases, for reasons peculiarly applicable to them, that as
carriers of both passengers and freight, the rules as to the responsibility of common carriers and of passenger carriers shoul d be applied
to them with full force. Being recognized as public utilities as well as
private enterprises extensive rights and franchises have been conferred
upon them which are not enjoyed by other carriers, among them being
the right to invoke the power of eminent domain. Not only have they
been fostered by the Government but by reason of aggregation of
capital and the great facilities which they control for the transportation
of all the commodities of commerce, they have practically monopolized
the land carriage of the country. It is bit just, therefore, that in their
dealings with the public, whether as carriers of goods or of passengers,
they should be held to that strict accountability which the public safety
and policy require."
To blindly follow precedent is to do away with individual reasoning. However, the premises laid down in the above quotation
from an eminent authority are without, question true and the
conclusion drawn from the same is not only logical but fair and
just. Likewise, all that is said therein as to railroads, applies with
just as much force, fairness and justice to operators of air lines
engaged in the same character of business. Indeed, as to air lines,
even greater rights and franchises are granted than the power of
eminent domain, for while it is not a firmly established doctrine
conceded on all sides, that an aviator has a right to use the air
over the property of a subjacent owner of the land, certainly the
great trend of thought and authority permits such action, but not
without consent of the Government. In addition, in a great many
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instances, municipal airports are provided as terminals for commercial lines, without expense to the aviator, except for service
charges. Furthermore, the Federal Government through the Department of Commerce, has laid out and mapped the leading airways of the country and lighted many of, them and in every way
cooperated with and fostered the growth and development of air
transportation as an avenue of commerce. Surely under these circumstances when a railroad companyi is admittedly held to the
degree of liability imposed upon a common carrier, it is nothing
more than right and just that air transportation companies:
"In their dealing with the public, whether as carriers of goods or
of passengers, they should be held to that strict accountability which
the public safety and policy require."
In a report to the American Air Transport Association, on
the question of a Uniform Ticket Contract and Standard Ticket
Form, a Committee of that Association relative) to the question of
whether an air transport company should be regarded as a common
carrier or not, said in consideration of one of the conditions recommended to be printed upon a Standard Ticket Form, the following:
"Any attempt to limit liability of the carrier where it is caused by
the carrier's negligence or misfeasance is certainly against public policy
and in the opinion of this Committee would be so held by the various
supreme courts of the land. No attempt has been made to force the
public to adhere to the theory that airplanes traveling on scheduled
flights and carrying passengers for hire are private carriers. The Railroad Company vs. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 357, clearly states that thp test
is not in what you say you are but in what you are actually doing.
There is hardly a company that has submitted its ticket form to your
committee that is not, in the opinion of a majority of the committee,
a common carrier and would be adjudicated such in any supreme court
of the land."
V.
Let us see what action has been taken, so far, by the authorities
in fixing this question of the civil liability of the aviator as a carrier
of goods and passengers. Our laws in this country, with the exception of the State of Louisiana and a few Southwestern states
that were formerly possessions or territory of Spain, all sound in
the common law of England and the laws of that country today
are frequently cited as authority as persuasive, if not controlling.
The Air Navigation Act of 1920 of the British Parliament 10 and
11 Geo. V. Chap. 80, Sec. 9, reads that:
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"Where material damage or loss is caused by an aircraft in flight,
taking off or landing, or by any person or any such aircraft, or by any
article falling from such aircraft, to any person or property on land
or water, damage shall be recoverable from the owner of; the aircraft
in respect to such damage or loss, without proof of negligence or intention or other cause of action, as though the same had been caused
by his wilful act, negligence or de fault, except when the damage or
loss was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of persons by
whom the same was suffered."
A careful reading of this Statute shows that it deals alone with
the question of liability to one, on land or water, as the result of an
aerial flight and does not touch the .question of the duty and obligation of the air operator to goods or passengers carried, nor is
there any declaration at all as to whether the air carrier is to be
regarded as a common or a private carrier. Presumably the theory
upon which this absolute liability for damage or injury to person
or property on the land or water beneath, in connection with an
aerial flight, is based upon the proposition that while the right to
navigate the air space above is granted, still there is enough left in
the old doctrine of cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum to guarantee to the owner of the subjacent land or water ownership in the
air space above, to prevent any interference with life or activity
on the land or water beneath by reason of such air passage and
that an air passage that does so interfere as to cause damage, constitutes a trespass. This appears to be a sound rule of conduct
consonant with reason, fairness and justice to all parties, but is
aside from the question of the duty and obligation owed to a passenger on, or owner of goods shipped by, the airplane.
Congress passed in May, 1926, what is now called the Air
Commerce Act of 1926,' and while there is no declaration of law
contained in that Act that specifically defines air operators as either
common or private carriers, the Act does contain certain regulatory provisions, or power to make the same is conferred upon the
Department of Commerce, and all through the Act there is the
clear inference that air transportation companies are to be regarded
as public utilities.
So far as the writer has been able to discover, there are no
decisions yet of any of our Federal courts that recognize any rule
of law affirmatively placing air transportation companies squarely
within the category ot common carriers, but again the clear inference from the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
7. 44 Stat. 576.
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Circuit in Brown v. Pacifc Mutual Life Insurance Co., supra. is,
that any aviator or aviation company whose operations come within
the meaning of "common carrier," as applied to any other known
means of transportation, would likewise be held to be such a common carrier.
The American Bar Association has done much creditable work
in considering this new branch of jurisprudence to meet, from a
judicial point of view, the new and novel conditions that development of air navigation has occasioned, and among those most prominently active in this work has been the Honorable William P. MacCracken, formerly Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics. This Association has adopted and recommended for passage
to the various states a Uniform State Law concerning aeronautics.
Among the provisions of that law are Sections 5, 6 and 7, which
read as follows:
"Sec. 5 (Damage on Land).-The owner. of every aircraft which
is operated over the land or waters of this state is absolutely liable for
injury to persons or property on the land or waters beneath caused by
the ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling
of any object therefrom, whether such owner was negligent or not,
unless the injury is caused, in whole or in part, by the negligence of
the person injured, or of the owner or bailee of the property injured.
If the aircraft is leased at the time of the injury to person or property,
both owner and lessee shall bel liable and they may be sued jointly or
either or both of them may be sued separately. An aeronaut who is
not the owner or lessee shall be liable only for the consequences of his
own negligence. The injured person or owner, or bailee of the injured
property shall have a lien on the aircraft causing the injury to the
extent of the damage caused by the aircraft or objects falling from it.
"Sec. 6 (Collision of Aircraft).-The liability of the owner of one
aircraft to the owner of another aircraft or to aeronauts or passengers
on either aircraft for damage caused by collision on land or in the air
shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to torts on land.
"Sec. 7 (Jurisdiction of Crimes and Torts).-Al crimes, torts,
and other wrongs committed by or against an aeronaut or passenger
while in flight over this state shall be governed by the laws of this state
and the question whether damage occasioned by or to an aircraft while
in flight over thisstate constitutes a crime, tort or other wrong by or
against, the owner of such aircraft, shall be determined by the laws of
this state."
This proposed law fixes the question of liability for damage
done to person or property .on the land or water beneath and is
largely similar to the British law. It is evidently based on the concession of the right of free navigation, provided there is no interference by the aircraft with the right of enjoyment of the air by the
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earth-bound creatures. While Section 5 of the Act does contain
a sentence reading that a aeronaut who is not the owner or lessee
shall be liable only for the consequences of his own negligence, we
are still left, even under the terms of this Act, with no definite statement of the question as to whether an aeronaut is a common carrier,
or not, or what rule of law should fix the degree of care or responsibility of the aeronaut to his passengers or goods entrusted to him
for carriage.
According to Aeronautics Bulletin No. 18 of the United States
Department of Commerce, Aeronautics Branch, up to September 1,
1929, every state and territory of the United States, including Hawaii
and the Philippines, with the exceptions of Alabama, Georgia and
Oklahoma, have passed statutes undertaking in one way or another
to regulate the operation of aircraft in the various states and territories or possessions. An examination of the statutes mentioned
shows that the following make no mention of -the question of the
civil liability of the aviator, nor specify what rule of law is applicable
in determining that issue:
Alask4
Kentucky
New York
Arkansas
Ma ine
Ohio
Oregon
Massachusetts
California
Minnesota
Philippines
Colorado
District of Columbia
Mississippi
Texas
Florida
Nebraska
Washington
Illinois
New Jersey
West Virginia
Iowa
New Hampshire
Wyoming
Kansas
New Mexico
The following states have in one form or another adopted,
through legislative enactment, the Uniform State Law recommended
by the American Bar Association, which fixes a method of determining liability for damage or injury to person or property on the
land or water beneath, but sheds little light on the question of
whether the aeronaut who transports goods or persons for hire,
should do business under the duties and obligations of a common
carrier, private carrier or otherwise:
Delaware
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Maryland
Michigan

Nevada
North Carolina
North Dakota
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Wisconsin

The State of Arizona, by Act approved March 6, 1929, has
adopted a rule of liability that makes both the pilot and employer
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liable for such damage as results from the negligence of the pilot

while controlling the aircraft himself or while giving instructions
to others. This statute likewise provides that the liability of the
owner for collision shall be determined by the rules of law applicable
to torts on land and that:
"All crimes, torts and other wrongs while in flight over the state,

shall be governed by the laws of the state."

However, there is no declaration as to what degree of care is required or whether the negligence referred to is that of an ordinary
bailee or that of a common carrier, but it is thought that as to the
carriage of goods, this statute would be held not to create as great
a degree of liability on the part of the aeronaut as the common law
imposes upon a common carrier.
The law in Connecticut, as stated in Chapter 324, passed May
10, 1927, of the laws of that state, is somewhat similar to that of
Arizona and may be stated to be that the pilot is responsible for
all damages to either person or property caused by aircraft directed
by him or under his control, which damage shall have resulted
from the negligence of the pilot, either in controlling the aircraft
himself or while giving instructions to another. If the pilot is the
agent or employee of another, both he and his principal or employer
are responsible for damage, provided any pilot and/or principal
or employer would be responsible for injuries to any passenger only
whern such injury shall result from the negligence of such pilot.
Here again it would seem that the common law liability of a common carrier as an insurer, so far as goods are concerned, would not
apply, since the liability is made to depend upon "negligence" and,
also, there is no attempt to determine the degree of negligence in
fixing the liability. In commenting upon this Connecticut Statute,
Mr. Henry G. Hotchkiss in his work on "Aviation Law," published
in 1928, has pointed out that Connecticut was the first state in the
Union to adopt a law, in which tho specific test of liability in cases
of damages to passengers or property in connection with aircraft
was fixed by law, being an Act of that State's Legislature passed
in 1911 aad under which absolute liability was declared, and says:
"The measure of liability thus adopted (that is by a later Act of
1927) can hardly have been arrived at fortuitously, since it was Connecticut that adopted the first law relating to aviation in the United
States in 1911, and in this law the rule on absolute liability was provided
'8
for and 'every aeronaut was held responsible for all damages'."
8. Hotchkiss in Aviation Law, Page 38.
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It would thus appear that in Connecticut, at present, it is the rules
of ordinary negligence that determine liability and not the standard required under the common law rules applicable to common
carriers, either as to goods or passengers, or the absolute liability
fixed in the original Act of 1911.
In Louisiana, there is no statutory law as to what standard of
care should be used to determine liability but Act 52, approved
June 6, 1926, makes it the duty of every person, firm or corporation
engaged in the business of operating airplanes, whether if owner,
lessee or otherwise, for the purpose ot, carrying passerigers for
hire within the state, to procure and execute an indemnity bond in
the amount of $15,000.00 if only one airplane is used in said business, and an increase of $1,000.00 additional for every additional
airplane with a good and solvent surety company authorized to do
business in the state as surety, with the obligation running in favor
of any person who may be injured in person or property, or otherwise suffer loss or damage by the operation of any airplane so
used by said person, firm or corporation in said business in the
State of Louisiana. From this Statute it might be reasonably
argued that as to both goods and passengers there is an absolute
liability on the part of the aviator regardless of negligence, the
only proof necessary to recover under the bond, at any rate, being
a showing of loss or damage as the result of the operation of the
airplane.
In Massachusetts, the situation is not altogether clear. Quoting
again from Mr. Hotchkiss on Page 39 from his "Aviation Law"
we find the following:
"In Massachusetts, the State first adopted a statute fixing a heavy,
though not absolute, liability for aircraft accidents. In the Acts of 1913,
Chapter 663, Section 6, it is provided that an airman 'shall be liable for
injuries resulting from his flight unless he can demonstrate that he had
taken every reasonable precaution to prevent such injury.' This law
was changed by the Act of 1919, Chapter 306, reading ih part as follows:
'No person shall operate aircraft over buildings, persons or
animals in such manner as to endanger his own life or the lives or
safety of those below him, or the safety of himself and his passengers, if he be carrying passengers.'
"This Act was in turti repealed by the Acts of 1922, chapter 535,
an4 again by the Acts of 1925, chapter 189, in neither of which are
any standards of negligence set up. The absence of any pronouncement on the question of negligence is frequent enough in many state
statutes. But in Massachusetts the legislature had definiely adopted
a rule or standard of liability for aircraft different from the usual rule
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in these matters. When, then, it dropped or repealed the new rule, it
seems a reasonable inference that the Legislature intended that the
ordinary rules of negligence shall apply. It is the writer's opinion
that Massachusetts, like Connecticut has adopted the ordinary rules of
negligence."
The writer is rather disposed to agree with this reasoning of
Mr. Hotchkiss but in the Bulletin of the Department of Commerce,
referred to in the first part of this article, Massachusetts is listed
among the states as having no statutory law defining the rules of
liability of an aviator.
Missouri, by Act of its Legislature approved June 1, 1929, declared that the liability of the owner of one aircraft to the owner
of another aircraft or to areonauts or passengers on either aircraft
for damages caused by collision on land or in the air, shall be determined by rules of law applicable to torts on land and all crimes,
torts and other wrongs committed while in flight shall be governed
by the laws of the state. This is quite similar to the Uniform State
Law recommended by the American Bar Association and as I interpret the same would leave to the courts to determine whether the
airplane carrier comes within the definition of a common carrier
or not, with the resultant rights and obligations arising therefrom.
Montana, by Senate Bill No. 25, passed February 19, 1929, has
declared that the landing of aircraft on the land or waters of another, without his consent, is unlawful except in the case of forced
landings and that in the event damages are caused by forced landings, the owner or lessee of the aircraft, or the airman, shall be
liable for actual damage caused by such forced landing. Otherwise,
there is no attempt in that State to fix the rules determining the
liability of the airman.
The State of Pennsylvania appears to have approached this
new field of jurisprudence with more care and attention than any
other state in the Union. By Statute known as Act No. 316, approved April 25, 1929, and effective from and after July 1, 1929,

most minute provisions have been made as to many details, and an
apparent effort made to cover the entire field of statutory regulations. Another Statute, known as Act No. 317, but approved the
same day, declares that the owner or the operator, or either of them,
of every aircraft which is operated over the lands or waters of the

Commonwealth shall be liable' for injuries or damages to either
person or property on or over the land or water beneath caused
by the ascent, descent or flight of aircraft or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom in accordance with the rules of law
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applicable to torts on land in that Commonwealth and jurisdiction
over crimes and torts are governed by the laws of the Commonwealth. Act No. 316 creates a State Aeronautics Commission and
defines its powers. Article XII of this Act defines what shall constitute commercial flying and provides that:
"It shall be unlawful to operate or navigate civil aircraft engaged
in commercial flying within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania without
first having had and obtained:
(1) From the Commission, commercial flying licenses for all civil
aircraft so used or to be used; and
(2) A certificate evidencing the approval of the Commission of
the qualifications and safety of the aircraft, airport, landing
field or other navigation facilities used or to be used in such
commercial flying."
Section 1203 of this Act then provides:
"It shall be unlawful to operate or navigate civil aircraft as a
common carrier within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania without first
having had and obtained:
(1) From the Commission, commercial flying licenses for all civil
aircraft used or to be used; and
(2) A certificate evidencing the approval of the Commission of
the qualifications and safety of the aircraft, airport, landing
field or other navigation facilities used or to be used in such
commercial flying; and
(3) A certificate of public convenience evidencing the approval
of' the Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania of the
right and privilege to operate such aircraft as a common
carrier."
The other regulatory powers of the Commission are then set
forth, including how its hearing shall be conducted, and then among
other provisions in Section 1207 is the recital that:
"The Public Service Commission shall first determine whether or
not the services performed or to be performed by the applicant constitute operation of aircraft as a common carrier within this Commonwealth. Should the Public Service Commission determine that such
service does not constitutel operation of aircraft as a common carrier,
the complete record shall be returned to the Commission with the report
of such finding by the Public Service Commission."
Other pertinent portions of this Act are as follows:
"Sec. 1208. Following a determination by the public service commission that the service performed or to be performed by an applicant
constitutes operation of an aircraft as a common carrier, the public
service commission shall then determine whether or-not the granting
or approval of such application is necessary or proper for the service,
accommodation, or convenience of the public.

AIRCRAFT CIVIL LIABILITY

"Sec. 1209. The Powers and duties of the public-service commission to supervise and regulate the transportation of persons and
property by civil aircraft as a common carrier shall remain in the
public-service commission, excepting and reserving, however, the right
and duty conferred by this act upon the State aeronautic commission to
license, supervise, and regulate the qualifications, equipment and safety
of civil aircraft, airmen, airports, landing field, and air-navigation
facilities used or to be used as common carriers within this Commonwealth.
"Sec. 1210. Following the determination of the public-service commission that the services engaged in or to be engaged in by aircraft in
commercial flying does not constitute the operation of aircraft as a
common carrier within this Commonwealth, and the return of the record, the commission shall issue to the applicant a commercial flying
license and its certificate of qualifications and safety, which certificate
shall authorize the operation of aircraft in commercial flying within
this Commonwealth, subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the
commission. Should the commercial flying so engaged in become at any
time an operation of aircraft as a common carrier, such commercial
flying shall then become unlawful, without first having obtained a certificate from the public-service commission of its approval of such
operation of aircraft as a common carrier.
"Sec. 1211. Whenever the public-service commission shall determine that an aircraft, airman, airport, landing field, or air-navigation
facility has been engaged in transportation of passengers, property, or
merchandise as a common carrier, within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania without first having secured a certificate of public convenience
to so operate from the public-service commission as provided it this
act, it may certify such determination and finding to the commission,
together with its) request that the registration or license issued by the
commission for such aircraft, airman, airport, landing field, or airnavigation facility, be suspended or revoked. The commission shall
suspend or revoke the registration and license of any aircraft, airman,
airport, landing field, or air-navigation facility upon the certification
and request of the public-service commission as above provided."
This Statute is the most pretentious and comprehensive of any
State Legislative Enactment affecting or applicable to civil aviation
that the writer has found and in the author's opinion is admirable
in all its provisions and could be well regarded as a model for all
the states to uniformly adopt. The public service commission determining the questiort of whether the aeronaut was a common
carrier there should be no difficulty in applying the same rules and
laws of liability as to him as are applied to other common carriers.
The State of Virginia has passed ai Statute regulating civil
aviation in that state (Chapter 463 H. B. 338, approved March 26,.
1928), which vests power in the State Corporation Commission to
issue, suspend or revoke licenses for civil aircraft, and power to
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promulgate such rules and regulations relative to air traffic and, such
kindred matters as said commission may deem proper and necessary.
No mention is made in the Act as to the rules of law applicable to
the liability or responsibility of the aviator but the State Corporation Commission has adopted a regulatory rule requiring liability
and property damage insurance from any operator before a license
to fly can be obtained.
There are some authorities who have advocated the adoption
of a third rule of liability as to air carriers, making them absolutely
liable in the event of damage or injury not only to goods but passengers, or in other words extending the common law liability of
insurers of common carriers of goods to passengers as well. There
seem to be two grounds advanced for this theory; first, that the
airplane should be regarded as a dangerous instrumentality, such
as explosives, ferocious animals and the like, and that anyone making use of such agencies does so at his peril and in the event of
damages following, can excuse himself only by showing that the
same was the result of some vis major or the act of God; secondly,
that by the very nature of things proof of negligence is exceedingly
difficult for the passenger or shipper if not next to impossible.
It has also been argued that such a rule furnished at least a fixed
standard to go by, under which insurance could be obtained by the
carrier for his protection. As to the first reason advanced when it
is considered that in scheduled air transport operations for the
period from January to June, 1929, there were 9,201,338 miles
flown and the mileage fo& each fatal, accident was 1,022,371, it
seems scarcely fair to look upon the airplane as a dangerous instrumentality. As to proof of negligence, the Department of Commerce is able to render a report analyzing accidents in aircraft so
as to classify them as being due to negligence of personnel, failure
of power plant, structural defects, faulty instruments, handling,
qualities, inclement weather, airport or terrain difficulties and it is,
therefore, not thought that this is a valid or persuasive reason for
imposing greater burdens on this industry than that under which
the other mechanical commercial activities of our times exist. Of
course, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of liability,
but more properly considered is nothing but a rule of evidence and
it may be that it would be wise to establish a doctrine that as to
airplane accidents this rule of evidence would apply upon mere
proof of the contract- of carriage and damage, loss or injury resulting therefrom, would make out a prima facie case, so as to shift
the burden upon the defendant, of showing that the damage was not
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the result of negligence or failure to exercise any duty or obligation resting upon it or any other character of common carrier. As
to the question of insurance, Mr. Hotchkiss on Pages 40 and 41
of his work above referred to, advances the following criticism
with apparent soundness:
"The most persuasive argument in favor of the rule of absolute
liability is the one that asserts that the loss will be spread by means
of insurance. The difficulty with this argument is that it is an assumption contrary to fact. Modern insurance is firmly based on actuarial postulates. Despite the advance in aviation during the past years
there is as yet insufficient data of passengers and freight carrying by
air to enable the construction of proper actuarial tables. This is true
in the United States, and to a lesser degree in England an4 n con-4
tinental Europe.
"This being the fact, the insurance of passengers of freight carried
by air resolves itself into a series of negotiations covering each particular case with the certainty that the premium in any case will be high.
The costliness of the premium makes it out, of the question for small
companies or independent fliers to cover themselves. Therefore, in
their cases the rule of absolute liability, in case of accident, makes no
difference.
"In the case of the more strongly intrenched companies the high
premiums offer a difficult obstacle. To include it in the charges for
passengers or freight is to raise what must at present be a high rate,
still higher. To add it without raising the rate is to decrease the chance
of operating in tho only way that private airlines should be operated,
that is, at a profit. As a result there is a strong temptation for the
company to be its own insurer.
"The fact is that the rule of absolute liability largely defeats its
own purpose unless it is coupled with compulsory insurance. If and
when the use of aircraft is sufficiently widespread to permit of the
imposition of a tax to create an insurance fund then the rule might
properly be invoked. This time has not come yet in aviation and in
many States has not been reached with reference to the omnipresent
automobile."
In addition to all this, what reason is there that this :species
of carrier should have imposed upon it higher or greater responsibility than those which rest on other carriers? After much consideration of the question and almost daily contact with it, the
writer is convinced that it would be unfair to impose this different
and more burdensome rule on the aviator and would constitute a
kind of class legislation or differentiation, lacking in justice and
right dealing.
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VI.
From all of the above it appears:
(1) That there is no fixed or uniform rule of law in federal
or state jurisprudence on the question of the civil liability
of the aviator.
(2) That some states have fixed an absolute liability for damages to person or property on the land or water beneath
as the result of the operation of aircraft, and others have
taken no positive stand.
(3) That some states, notably Connecticut and Massachusetts,
appear to have adopted a rule of mere ordinary negligence
to determine the liability of the airplane carrierfor loss
or damage to goods or passengers.
(4) That one state, Pennsylvania, appears to think that the
aviator, when he comes within the definition of a common carrier, as applied to other means and modes of
transportation,should be, held to a similar degree of care
and responsibility as any other common carrier.
(5) That some air transport companies, regardless of the
character of business they conduct, seek to claim the
privilege of regarding themselves as private or special
carriers.
In conclusion, it is submitted that no one can doubt the wisdom
of a uniform rule under both federal and state jurisdictions and
the opinion of the writer is that in all fairness there is no just reason
for regarding the airplane operator in the carriage of goods or passengers from any different point of view than that under which
other carriers function and that if common custom and public opin,
ion is to settle our aviation law, then that law should be similar to
all assuming responsibilities of like character under it. If other
common carriers are insurers of goods, and are bound to exercise
the highest degree of care known to mankind in that particular art
or science, as to passengers, then that same rule of law, and no
other, should apply to the aviator.
The lawyers should be the most dominant factor in molding
public opinion and seeing that that public opinion, as reflected in
judicial decisions or statutory enactments, is based on principles of
justice and right, and this article is submitted as an argument for
the members of the Legal profession to take part in the formation
of the principles of law in this new field of jurisprudence, along
those lines.

